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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of marketing cooperatives on smallholder commercialization of cereals using 
detailed household data in rural Ethiopia. We use the strong government role in promoting the establishment of 
cooperatives to justify the use of propensity score matching in order to compare households that are cooperative 
members to similar households in comparable areas without cooperatives. The analysis reveals that while 
cooperatives obtain higher prices for their members, they are not associated with a significant increase in the 
overall share of cereal production sold commercially by their members. However, these average results hide 
considerable heterogeneity in the impact across households. In particular, we find smaller farmers tend reduce 
their marketed output as a result of higher prices, while the opposite is true for larger farmers.  
JEL Classification: Q13, O12 
 
Introduction 
It is increasingly recognized that the 
commercialization of surplus output from small-scale 
farming is closely linked to higher productivity greater 
specialization, and higher income (see Timmer 
(1997)). Furthermore, in a world of efficient markets, 
commercialization leads to the separation of household 
production decisions from consumption decisions, 
supporting food diversity and overall stability. At the 
macro level, commercialization has also been shown 
to increase food security and, more generally, to 
improve allocative efficiency (Timmer (1997), 
Fafchamps (2005).However, in the face of imperfect 
markets and high transaction costs, many smallholders 
are rarely able to exploit the potential gains from the 
commercialization (de Janvry et al. (1991), Key et al. 
(2000)). In the absence of mechanisms to cope with 
these constraints, smallholders are unlikely to 
participate in markets, or when they do, to realize the 
full benefits of participation. These challenges are 
particularly important in sub-Saharan Africa, where 
empirical evidence suggest that the proportion of 
farmers engaged in subsistence agriculture remains 
very high. Those that participate in markets often do 
so only at the margins because of high risks and costs 
associated (Jayne et al. (2006). Over the past decade, 
donors and governments have regained interests in 
collective action mechanisms to overcome 
smallholders’ marketing constraints (Berdegué (2001), 
Collion and Rondot (1998), World Bank (2003)), 
although the empirical record suggests varying levels 
of success (e.g. Uphoff (1993), Tendler (1983), 
Sharma and Gulati (2003), Neven et al. (2005), 
Damiani (2000), Chirwa et al. (2005), Attwood and 
Baviskar (1987), Bernard et al. (2006)). This growing 
experience documents external and internal conditions 
under which these organizations may be more or less 
effective at serving their members. Less studied 
however, is the effective impact of collective action on 
the level of members’ commercialization, as compared 
to their likely situation had they not been members. 
One reason is the inherent challenge of addressing 
selection biases in both the location and the 
membership of these organizations. This paper 
attempts to address this challenge by presenting 
evidence on the relationship between smallholder 
commercialization and collective action mechanisms 
in Ethiopia. 
Since 1994, a pillar of Ethiopia’s rural development 
strategy has been the active promotion of marketing 
cooperatives as a means of commercializing 
smallholder agriculture. Accordingly, each kebele (In 
Ethiopia, kebeles or peasant associations (PAs) are the 
smallest administrative unit below the woreda 
(district) level. For purposes of comparison, kebeles 
correspond to villages in other countries.) is expected 
to have a cooperative by 2010, through which 90% of 
the agricultural inputs and 60% of the agricultural 
outputs will be marketed. As of 2005, only 10% of 
inputs and surplus production are marketed through 
cooperatives, suggesting the need for further analysis 
to meet strategic expectations. It is in this context that 
this paper assesses the effective impact of cooperatives 
on smallholders’ commercialization behavior.  Cooperatives and Smallholder Farmers 
428  AAAE Ghana Conference 2007 
Our analysis relies on propensity score matching 
techniques to properly identify the effect of 
cooperatives on their members, using a new dataset 
specifically designed to investigate commercialization 
behavior of Ethiopian smallholders. In particular, we 
use the strong government support for cooperatives 
and their target of one cooperative per kebele by 2010 
to assume that the decision of where to establish a 
cooperative is exogenous to members themselves. If 
this is true, we can thus compare households living in 
kebeles with access to a cooperative to similar 
households living in comparable kebeles without 
access to a cooperative. At the time of survey, the 
extent of coverage was less than 35%, and can thus be 
viewed as an interim stage in the long-term target.  
Our analysis shows that while cooperatives obtain 
higher price per unit of output for their members, 
cooperative members do not tend to sell more of their 
surplus output to the market. We further refine the 
analysis by investigating the heterogeneity of 
cooperatives’ impact across households, and find that 
poorer households tend to sell less of their product 
when facing a higher price obtained as a result of their 
membership, while larger farmers tend to behave 
oppositely. The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 presents the institutional 
background linked to the recent development of 
smallholders’ marketing cooperatives in Ethiopia. 
Section 3 presents the propensity score matching 
strategy adopted in the paper, followed by a brief 
description of the data use, in Section 4. The effective 
kebele-level and household-level matching procedures 
are detailed in Section 5 and results given in Section 6. 
In Section 7, we further refine the analysis by 
investigating cooperative’s heterogeneous impact on 
smallholders’ behavior. Section 8 concludes with a set 
of policy recommendations.  
Recent cooperative development in Ethiopia 
Cooperatives have a long and tumultuous history in 
Ethiopia starting from the Imperial era (19xx to 1973) 
and continuing through the military regime (the Derg, 
1974-1991). The largely negative experiences with 
cooperatives led to their dissolution following the fall 
of the Derg, until  1994 when the Government of 
Ethiopia expressed renewed interest in collective 
action to promote greater market participation by 
smallholders (cf. Proclamations 85/1994 and 
147/1998). Accordingly, “it has become necessary to 
establish cooperative societies which are formed of 
individuals on voluntary basis and who have similar 
needs for creating savings and mutual assistance 
among themselves by pooling their resources, 
knowledge and property; (...) it has become necessary 
to enable cooperative societies to actively participate 
in the free market system” (Proclamation 147/1998). 
This was later re-affirmed in the Sustainable 
Development and Poverty Reduction Program 
(SDPRP, 2002) and the Plan for Accelerated and 
Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP, 
2005), in which cooperatives are given a central role in 
the country’s rural development strategy. 
In 2002, the Federal Cooperative Agency of Ethiopia 
was created to organize and promote cooperatives at 
the national level. As of today, its ambitious five year 
development plan (2006-2010) aims at providing 
cooperative services to 70% of the population by 2010, 
increasing the share of the cooperative input marketing 
up to 90%, and increasing the share in cooperative 
output marketing to 60% (from 10% in 2005). This is 
expected to be achieved through the establishment of 
primary cooperatives in each kebele, and bolstered by 
the establishment of 500 new cooperative unions (from 
100 at present), six cooperative federations, and a 
cooperative league (Federal Cooperative Agency of 
Ethiopia (2006).  
As a result of this policy thrust, cooperatives have 
expanded rapidly in Ethiopia. However in 2005, nearly 
65% of the kebeles still do not have such an 
organization: on average, these are kebeles with lower 
market access. Moreover, participation into 
cooperatives remains limited: only 17% of households 
living in kebeles with a cooperative are members. 
Although cooperatives are not meant to be selective, 
participants tend to be better-off in terms of physical 
and human capital (Bernard et al., 2007).  
Overall, these results suggest –as expected- that direct 
intra-Kebele comparisons of members with non-
members will lead to bias estimates; the same is true 
for a simple comparison of households in Kebeles with 
and Kebeles without cooperatives. Instead, we propose 
in the following section a two-step propensity score 
matching approach to overcome biases due to both the 
location of the cooperative and the self-selection of 
members into these organizations.  
Empirical strategy 
We saw in the previous section that relatively better-
off households tend to participate more in Tanguy, B. et al.  
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cooperatives. However, other non-observable aspects 
may also be at play, such as the household’s risk 
preference, its entrepreneurial spirit, or its relationship 
to other cooperative members. Thus, a simple 
comparison between households that are members of a 
cooperative, with household that are not members, 
even within the same kebele and after controlling for 
observable characteristics, would lead to biased 
estimates. This is due to the fact that because people 
self-select into cooperatives, the observed differences 
between members and non-members may either totally 
or partially reflect original differences between 
members and non-members, instead of the effects of 
the cooperative as such.  
To overcome this selection bias, a proper evaluation 
would require a comparison at the same point in time 
between (a) the commercialization behavior of a given 
household when it is a member of a cooperative and 
(b) the commercialization behavior of the same 
household when it is not member of the cooperative. 
Obviously, such double observation is not feasible. 
Instead, we propose here to use propensity score 
matching techniques, as developed initially in 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), later in Heckman et al. 
(1997, 1998), and now used extensively in the 
economic evaluation literature (Jalan and Ravallion 
(2003)). In studies on agriculture and rural 
development, applications of these techniques include 
for example impact assessments of farmers field 
schools (Gotland et al. (2004)) and community driven 
development (Rao and Ibanez (2003)), or assessments 
of infrastructure investments such as pipe water (Jalan 
and Ravallion (2003)) and road rehabilitation (Van de 
Walle and Cratty (2002)).  
We engage here in a two-step propensity score 
matching approach to overcome biases due to both the 
location of the cooperative and the self-selection of 
members into these organizations. In our setting, the 
propensity score ) (x p , is defined as the probability 
that a given household would participate in a 
cooperative, given a set of observable characteristics, 
x. The underlying assumption is that, conditional on 
the propensity score, members and non-members of 
the cooperatives become comparable. However, since 
x  may only capture a household’s observable 
characteristics despite the fact that less directly 
observable factors may be influencing the household’s 
decision to join a cooperative (e.g., the household’s 
social capital stock), the distribution of unobservable 
characteristics may systematically differ between 
members and non-members, leading to a biased 
estimate of the impact of cooperatives. Other sources 
of bias when comparing members and non-members 
within the same kebele may come from the likely 
existence of spillover effects of the cooperative’s 
activity on non-members. For example, we sometimes 
cooperative may exert market pressures on local 
traders through increased competition. Finally, non-
members may benefit from economic dynamism 
generated by a cooperative in its community (e.g. 
through processing activities). Overall, these spillover 
effects will tend to exert a downward bias on the 
measure of the cooperatives impact of their members. 
These potential sources of bias can be overcome by 
comparing cooperative members to households with 
similar propensity scores living in comparable kebeles 
without cooperatives. However, non-observable 
factors may also be at play in the location of 
cooperatives. In particular, in the case of member-
created cooperatives, such organizations are often 
associated with the presence of effective leadership or 
other community-specific factors that enable such a 
group to emerge independently of exogenous policy 
targets. As such, observed differences in marketing 
behavior between households that are members of 
cooperatives and similar households in kebeles without 
cooperatives would lead to biased estimates, even after 
controlling for the kebeles’ observable characteristics.  
In Ethiopia however, most cooperatives were initiated 
under the impulse of an external partner: 63% were 
created by government institutions, 11% by donor 
agency or NGOs, and only 26% by members 
themselves. Dropping from our sample those kebeles 
in which cooperatives were member-created, we 
assume that the establishment of cooperatives is 
exogenous from communities’ unobservable 
characteristics as well as from that of their members. It 
follows that differences in unobservable characteristics 
between cooperative members and households with 
similar propensity score (but leaving in kebeles 
without cooperatives) are considered as random and 
will not bias the estimator. This is represented in 
equation (1) below, where y is the measured outcome 
(for example, the percentage of the household’s 
production that is commercialized); c is equal to 1 for 
the households living in a kebele where there is a 
cooperative and 0 otherwise; and the subscripts c and 
c / denote participation and non-participation, 
respectively. Cooperatives and Smallholder Farmers 
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(1) 
It can be argued that even though households are fully 
comparable, certain environmental conditions may 
also affect the cooperative’s impact on their marketing 
behavior. We address this issue by matching kebeles 
with and kebeles without cooperatives that share 
similar sets of development constraints and 
opportunities, using the development domains 
developed for Ethiopia by Chamberlain, Pender and 
Yu (2006) and discussed in detail later. These domains 
are calculated through threshold in four variables 
(altitude, population density, distance to the closest 
market, moisture availability) that best capture the 
heterogeneity of farmers’ livelihoods in Ethiopia. 
One may also argue that households need to have 
access to the same markets for the propensity score to 
provide reliable estimates of the cooperatives’ impact 
(Heckman et al, (1997, 1998)). Although several 
studies have found that market integration has 
significantly increased in Ethiopia since the early 
1990’s liberalization (Dercon (1995), Negassa and 
Jayne (1997), Negassa (1998)) it is likely that 
geographic location still matters. However, as will be 
shown below, in the sample retained for this analysis, 
kebeles with and kebeles without cooperatives are 
quite evenly distributed across the territory, suggesting 
that such bias—if it exists—is of limited importance.  
Finally, it may be suggested that alternative empirical 
strategies be used to overcome selection biases. For 
instance, an instrumental variable approach could be 
used to overcome biases due to households’ self-
selection into the cooperatives. However, it is likely 
that cooperatives exert potentially important spillover 
effects on non-members within the Kebele. In some 
cases, non-members are allowed to sell their output to 
the cooperatives, at conditions sometimes equal to that 
obtained by the members. In other cases, the mere 
presence of the cooperative in the locality may exert 
upward pressures on the prices offered to farmers by 
the local traders. 
In this case, an instrumental variable approach would 
naturally underestimate the effect of cooperatives on 
their members.  
Data 
We apply the above-described empirical analysis using 
a new dataset specifically collected to investigate 
commercialization behavior of Ethiopian smallholders. 
The Ethiopian Smallholders Commercialization 
Survey (ESCS) was jointly designed by the 
International Food Policy Research Institute, the 
Ethiopian Development Research Institute, and the 
Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia, and aims to 
provide support to in-depth analysis of smallholders’ 
commercialization behavior. Data were collected over 
the summer 2005, and include 7,186 households 
randomly drawn from 293 kebeles. The sample is 
considered representative at the national level as well 
as at the regional level for four regions: Amhara, 
Oromia, SNNP (Southern Nations, Nationalities, and 
Peoples Regional State) and Tigray.  
At the community level, the ESCS collected 
information on population, infrastructure, markets 
prices, institutions and development programs. At the 
household level, the ESCS covered a large number of 
issues, including demographics, human capital stock, 
employment, land production and input use, crop and 
livestock production and disposition over the previous 
24 months, marketing channels and contractual 
arrangements, physical assets, social capital and 
participation in cooperatives, as well as primary 
information on the cooperative itself. Note, however, 
that the ESCS did not collect information on 
household consumption and expenditures.  
Among the 293 kebeles, 94 had at least one 
cooperative at the time of the survey. However, only 
kebeles with externally-created cooperatives were 
considered here in order to satisfy the assumptions set 
forth in the previous section. Overall, 66 kebeles with 
only externally created cooperatives identified and 
designated as the “treatment group” for this study. The 
remaining 199 kebeles were thus designated as the 
“control group”. As will be discussed in the next 
section, the final sample used in the analysis was 
further reduced to ensure that estimates properly 
capture the impact of cooperatives per se. 
Matching 
In this section we detail the matching procedure. We 
propose a two-step matching procedure where we first 
match  kebeles with cooperatives to similar ones 
without cooperatives (5.1), before matching members 
of cooperatives to households that would have 
possibly participated had they had access (5.2).  
Matching kebeles 
As mentioned above, we consider the present 
allocation of cooperatives to be exogenous and are Tanguy, B. et al.  
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thus able to conduct a simple matching of kebeles 
based on selected observable characteristics. However, 
this assumption can only hold for kebeles where no 
cooperatives were created by members themselves, 
reducing our overall sample from 293 to 265 kebeles. 
To add to the robustness of our estimations, we also 
remove from the sample the 53 kebeles where 
households are said to have access to cooperatives in 
nearby  kebeles. Overall, our sample consist of 66 
treatment kebeles (where at least one cooperative can 
be found), and 146 control kebeles where no 
cooperatives exist.  
The next step is to ensure that the treatment kebeles 
are sufficiently comparable to the control ones. To do 
so, we apply the notion of development domains 
provided by Chamberlain, Pender and Yu (2006) to the 
kebele level. Development domains are defined as 
geographic locations sharing broadly similar rural 
development constraints and opportunities. The 
classification is based on the combination of four 
characteristics that best capture the heterogeneity of 
livelihood heterogeneity among smallholders in 
Ethiopia. These characteristics are altitude, population 
density, distance to the closest market and moisture 
reliability. Their aggregation is based on thresholds 
established to maximize the predictive power of the 
domains. Although a recent analytical innovation, the 
development domain framework is increasingly used 
by various government and donor agencies involved in 
rural development in Ethiopia. 
In our sample, kebeles can be classified into 22 
different domains. To test the validity of these 
domains as predictors for the existence of cooperatives 
(again, only the ones created by the government or by 
another external partner), we use a Probit estimation 
where the independent variable is the existence or 
absence of a cooperative, and the independent 
variables are dummy variables for each of the 
domains. Overall, this test performs relatively well in 
that domains successfully predict 70% of the existence 
of cooperatives. Table 1 below presents the 
distribution of our treatment and control kebeles across 
the 22 different domains. 
Next, according to our matching procedure, we need to 
ensure that a sufficient number of treatment and 
control kebeles exist within each domain. It appears 
from Table 1 that five domains (1, 2, 5, 12 and 15) 
capture more than 70% of the kebeles with at least one 
externally created cooperative, while the remaining 
30% are dispersed among 12 of the remaining 17 
domains. It also appears that these five domains 
include enough control kebeles to perform the 
analysis. Finally, although selective, these five 
domains are quite heterogeneous, with the only 
domain attribute not represented being the lowland 
areas. Some domains are highland moisture-reliable 
domains (1, 2, 5) while the others are highland, 
drought-prone domains (12 and 15); some have high 
market access (1, 2, 13) while the others are more 
remote (5 and 12); most have medium population 
density (2, 5, 12, 15), while one is more densely 
populated (1). Overall, we further refine our sample by 
focusing on treatment and control kebeles within these 
five development domains. 
To further check the sample’s validity, we present in 
Table 2 the distribution of treatment and control 
kebeles across the administrative regions of Ethiopia. 
Indeed, despite the existence of a Federal Cooperative 
Agency, the Regional Cooperative Offices are the ones 
deciding where and how cooperatives should be 
promoted, through directives passed to woreda 
cooperatives offices. As a result, there are important 
differences in cooperative development across regions 
(see Bernard et al. (2007) for detailed descriptions) 
which may need to be accounted for in the present 
analysis.  
< Table 1 about here > 
< Table 2 about here > 
As shown in Table 2, only three regions—Amhara, 
Oromia and SNNP—display a relatively balanced 
sample between treatment and control kebeles. In 
Tigray however, only one kebele was missing a 
cooperative in 2005, while Beneshangul-Gumuz and 
Harari only have one kebele included in the sample. A 
further refinement of the sample may thus be to limit it 
to Amhara, Oromia and SNNP regions. In Table 3, we 
test the balancing properties of both samples –
including and excluding Tigray, Beneshangul-Gumuz 
and Harari. Indeed, as was discussed in Section 3, the 
appropriateness of the sample used is based on 
whether the treatment kebeles are comparable to the 
control ones.  
As shown in Table 3, the sample using all regions 
performs poorly, evidenced by a significant difference 
between treatment and control kebeles in 50% of the 
tests performed. By comparison, the sample restricted 
to Amhara, Oromia and SNNP performs relatively Cooperatives and Smallholder Farmers 
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better, as the kebeles are on average similar in all 
dimensions covered by these tests. As such, we reject 
the suitability of the full sample and restrict ourselves 
to the sub-sample comprised of three regions which 
includes 33 treatment and 84 control kebeles. 
One last validity check is undertaken to ensure that 
treatment and control kebeles correspond to 
sufficiently similar locations, i.e., that the treatment 
and control observations are facing the same markets 
for their comparisons to be valid. Indeed, in the case 
where the treatment kebeles are clustered in areas 
different from the control kebeles, one could argue that 
the estimated differences between treatment and 
control reflect more local conditions than impacts of 
the cooperatives.  
< Table 3 about here > 
Figure 1 shows the geographic location of each kebele 
in our sub-sample against a background shading that 
indicates the level of market access for each kebele 
based on the development domain calculations. We 
find that (a) treatment and control groups are 
geographically mixed, thereby ensuring that the impact 
of cooperatives will not be driven by area-specific 
characteristics, and (b) the distribution of treatment 
and control kebeles by level of market access is also 
fairly balanced. 
Matching households 
As a result of the above exercise, the sub-sample now 
includes a total of 2,614 households, of which 1,798 
are in control kebeles and 816 are in treatment kebeles, 
of which 142 are cooperative members (Table 4). 
Although the sub-sample still includes a majority of 
the initial treatment kebeles, our efforts to increase 
robustness comes at the expense of national 
representativeness of the results. The purpose of this 
paper is not, however, to draw nationally 
representative conclusions, but rather to highlights the 
behavioral responses of households to cooperative 
membership. 
< Table 4 about here > 
Recall that the rationale for propensity score matching 
is to compare households that are members of 
cooperatives with households in kebeles without 
cooperatives that would have probably been members, 
had they had access to such an organization. In other 
words, we will match the 142 household members in 
the treatment kebeles, or the “treated households,” to 
households among the 1,798 in the control kebeles that 
most resemble them. For this, we first estimate each 
household’s “propensity score” or likelihood of 
joining a cooperative in the treatment kebeles, using a 
flexible Probit model where the dependent variable is 
membership status. Domain fixed effects are used to 
ensure matching within the domains. Alternatively, 
one could have performed the matching separately for 
each domain (and eventually proceed similarly for the 
estimation of the Average Treatment Effect (ATT) of 
cooperative membership on household behavior). 
However, as is clear from this relatively small sample 
of treated observations, this would have been too 
constraining on the data.Household characteristics 
include measures of the household’s assets (education 
level, radio ownership, non-farm income, land 
holding, livestock, etc.) introduced linearly as well as 
quadratically to augment the model’s predictive 
power. Finally, a set of dummy variables are included 
to account for the household’s cultivation of a 
particular cereal crop. All households in this sample 
are involved in cereal production. One may argue that 
involvement in a particular cereal’s production may 
well be a response to participation into the 
cooperative. As such, the estimated impact may be 
downward biased as it may not take into account a 
household’s change in production towards higher 
profit products. However, the purpose of the present 
paper is to investigate the cooperatives’ impact on 
smallholders’ marketing behavior. As such, one wants 
to compare marketing behavior of households engaged 
in similar production, whether or not this was driven 
by the cooperative.  
In addition, the present estimations are limited to 
cereals, which production is largely driven by soil and 
weather conditions in Ethiopia (Teff is mainly 
cultivated in highland areas north of Addis Ababa, 
Maize in the lowlands south of Addis Ababa, Sorghum 
in the North-West and the East, Barley along a North-
South meridian in the middle of the country (CSA / 
EDRI / IFPRI, Atlas of the Ethiopian Rural Economy 
(2006) p 59). Finally, all the estimations presented 
here were also performed without cereal dummies 
included, as well as with the actual level of each 
production. In all cases, there was no significant 
change in the results. 
The Probit estimation is better identified when 
undertaken on treatment kebeles only where the choice 
to join a cooperative does exist. We report estimates of 
the coefficients in Table 5. We also report the 
associated p-values although the purpose here is not to Tanguy, B. et al.  
New Frontiers of Agricultural Economics  433 
identify particular relationships, but rather to 
maximize the predictive power of the model. We find 
that the model correctly predicts 85% of the observed 
membership in cooperatives. 
< Table 5 about here > 
These coefficients are then used to generate propensity 
scores for the households living in control kebeles, 
determining which would have probably participated 
had they had access to a cooperative. On the basis of 
these propensity scores, households participating into 
cooperatives are matched to similar ones living in 
kebeles without access to such an organization.  
Several matching techniques can be used to match 
treatment and control households. Here we focus on 
two broadly-used methods, namely (i) non-parametric 
Kernel regression matching proposed by Heckman, 
Ishimura and Todd (1998), and (ii) five nearest 
neighbors matching. In the first case, each treated 
household is matched with the entire sample of 
controls. However, each control observation enters the 
estimate with a weight inversely proportional to its 
distance to the treatment one based on the propensity 
score distribution. In the second method, each 
treatment observation is matched with an average 
value of its five nearest control neighbors, again based 
on the propensity score distribution. To ensure 
maximum comparability of the treatment and control 
groups, the sample is restricted to the common support 
region, defined as the values of propensity scores 
where both treatment and control observations can be 
found.  
A straightforward way to test the validity of the 
matching procedure is to compare an average 
household’s characteristics within the treatment 
sample to the corresponding characteristics of the 
control group generated. Accordingly, the absence of 
significant differences between the treatment and 
control groups suggests a valid matching. We thus 
undertake a series of statistical tests for differences in 
household characteristics on three different samples:   
(a) cooperative members in treatment kebeles 
compared to all households in the control kebeles (an 
unmatched sample); (b) cooperative members in 
treatment kebeles compared to a subset of households 
in the control kebeles with kernel-based matching; and 
(c) cooperative members in treatment kebeles 
compared to a subset of households in the control 
kebeles selected through the five-nearest neighbors 
matching method.  
As shown in Table 6, the unmatched sample fails to 
satisfy the balancing properties in that households in 
treatment kebeles are on average significantly different 
in several aspects from the households in the control 
kebeles (column 1). However, when we use kernel-
based matching, no such significant differences appear 
after kernel-based weights are attributed to control 
observations (column 2). Finally, in the case of the 
five-nearest neighbors based matching, only two 
significant differences are observed, in the gender of 
the household head and the number of ruminant 
owned. Overall, these results suggest that matched 
samples are adequate to perform an impact analysis, 
whereas the non-matched sample is not.  
< Table 6 about here > 
Average impact of cooperatives 
This section presents estimates of the average 
impact of cooperatives on smallholders’ 
commercialization behavior in Ethiopia. We start by 
defining the dependent variables used in the 
estimations (6.1), before turning to the results per se 
(6.2).  
Measures of smallholders’ commercialization 
behavior. 
Several types of indicators can be used to capture 
commercialization behavior. Commercialization 
behavior may encompass both the conditions under 
which a given level of output is sold to market and the 
composition of output per se (Alemu, Gabre-Madhin 
and Dejene (2006)). Indeed, a farmer’s involvement in 
cash crop such as coffee or khat rather than in staple 
crops such as cereals may by itself reflect the 
commercial orientation of the household. In this paper 
however, we focus on the cooperatives’ capacity to 
provide market access to smallholders for output of 
major cereals (teff, sorghum, oats, maize, barley, 
wheat and millet). It should be noted that 98% of 
grains produced in Ethiopia are produced by 
smallholders, of which 80% are cereals (Gabre-
Madhin (2001)). As such, the present estimations are 
likely to reflect the general situation of non-pastoralist 
smallholders in the country. Our sample is therefore 
slightly reduced by focusing only on cooperatives that 
have a stated involvement in the commercialization of 
cereals. It should be noted that 25% of the 
cooperatives officially engaged in the marketing of 
agricultural output had not sold between 2004 and 
2005. However, this is mainly driven by cooperatives Cooperatives and Smallholder Farmers 
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in Tigray (55%) and less by the three regions included 
in the present sub-sample (less than 20%) (see Bernard 
et al. (2007). 
Here the impact of cooperatives on smallholders’ 
commercialization is assessed through two types of 
indicators. We first consider a price indicator to 
capture whether cooperatives enable their members to 
obtain a higher price for their output. Although it may 
not fully capture the individual farmers’ 
commercialization behavior, it is a fundamental 
indicator since cooperatives promotion policies often 
rely on the assumption that collective action can help 
smallholders obtain higher prices for their output 
through reduced transaction costs, increased 
bargaining power over traders, or the ability to reach 
more attractive markets.  
The price indicator that we use is a weighted average 
of the difference between the price received by the 
household member for each type of cereal sold, and 
the average price in the sample. This is described in 
the expression below, where PDi is the household-
level price indicator, lij is the proportion of land that is 
allocated to cereal j and sold by the household in year 
2005, pij is the price received by this household for 
product j, and  j p  is the average price received by the 
households sampled, for one kilogram of product j. In 
this indicator, the aggregation process across crops is 
meant to capture the effects of the household’s crop 
production profile. lij was proxied using the quantity 
sold by the household for each crop, and the national 
average yields for these crops computed by CSA for 
the years 2003 and 2004. Note however that all price-
related estimations were also performed on non-
weighted aggregates without significant effects on the 
results. 
  ( ) . ii j i j j
j
PDl p p =− ∑   
One can argue that the use of the sample average as 
the reference point is problematic in that it would lead 
to an upward bias when measuring the impact of 
cooperatives. If cooperatives are located in areas with 
higher prices to start with, a higher price for 
cooperative members may wrongly be attributed to the 
cooperatives and instead of local conditions. However, 
the use of local prices as the reference points may 
itself lead to downward bias, in that cooperatives are 
likely to exert spillover effects on local prices—either 
directly when they provide marketing services to non-
members, or indirectly through increased competition 
for traders. To avoid such biases, zonal or regional-
level aggregates as the reference point instead of the 
entire sample might be recommended. In this case 
however, the relatively small size of our sample at the 
zonal level as well as in some regions would provide 
us with imprecise estimates of the mean price. This in 
turn may severely affect the precision of our 
estimates.( As a robustness check, we have also run all 
the following estimations on the sub-sample of 
Kebeles from the Oromia region only. Indeed, Oromia 
is the only region in our sample which offers a large-
enough sample size (both in terms of cluster (Kebeles) 
and in terms of observations (households)) to obtain a 
relatively precise estimate of the mean price received 
by farmers. The results, although slightly greater in 
magnitude, were similar in their sign and statistical 
significance as the ones reported below) Overall, the 
best evidence in support of the use of a sample-wide 
average is provided by the map in Figure 1, which 
shows relatively clearly that treatment and control 
kebeles are geographically well-balanced, such that 
local effects should be observed in similar magnitudes 
in both treatment and control samples. 
We then consider a variable measuring the share of the 
cereal production that was sold in 2005, denoted PS. 
The expected outcomes are slightly ambiguous. 
Indeed, if cooperatives provide their members with a 
better price for their output, it may be the case that 
members’ liquidity constraints are relaxed for a lower 
level of output sold. In this case, the effect of 
cooperative membership on the percentage of 
production sold would be negative for households that 
are most cash-constrained due to the income effect. 
We return to these effects in Section 7 below. 
Average impact of cooperatives on their members 
Based on the matched sample, we compute measures 
of cooperatives’ impact on their members’ 
commercialization. The “average treatment effect on 
the treated” (ATT) measures the average difference 
between members’ commercialization indicators and 
the commercialization behavior of their corresponding 
match. Because analytical standard errors are not 
computable for the Kernel density matching methods, 
we use 100 bootstrap replications stratified at the 
development domain level to compute robust estimates 
for them. Note that the bootstrapped standard errors 
for the five-nearest neighbor estimator are very close Tanguy, B. et al.  
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to their analytical counterparts. For clarity, we only 
report the bootstrapped estimates in Table 7. 
We start with the price difference (PD) indicator and 
find that on average, cooperative members receive 7% 
higher prices for their cereal products than their non-
member counterparts. This effect is statistically 
significant and robust across both matching 
techniques. Although surprisingly large, this effect is 
consistent with the idea that collective action may 
increase the returns to commercialization for 
smallholder farmers. Turning to the share of 
production sold (PS) however, we find that 
cooperative membership does not have an impact 
significantly different from zero.  
(For comparison purposes, the same estimations were 
performed on a non restricted sample including all 
regions, Kebeles with member created cooperatives, 
and Kebeles without cooperatives but with access to 
one in nearby Kebeles. Results indicate a statistically 
significant effect on price of roughly 7%, similar to the 
results in Table 7. On the percentage production sold 
however, the estimates are negative and statistically 
significant, indicating that on average cooperatives led 
to a 3% decrease in the share of production sold by 
their members. However, as was argued throughout 
the paper, such results are difficult to interpret due to 
the likely endogeneity biases decribed.  
Let PS measure the household’s share of production 
sold and    PS  the share of production sold by its 
generated counterfactual, the curves in the upper graph 
represent the distribution of PS-   PS . Similarly, the 
distribution of  PD-   PD  is represented in the lower 
graph ) 
< Table 7 about here >: 
The overall conclusion from these estimates is 
somewhat surprising: despite a higher average price 
received for their outputs, cooperative members tend 
not to supply more of their production to the market.  
It is possible that these results reflect the troubled 
history of cooperatives in Ethiopia, and the fact that 
distrust of cooperatives persists among members and 
non-members alike. Information obtained through key 
informant interviews and a subsequent survey of 
cooperatives in Ethiopia suggest that suspicion and 
wariness of cooperatives has continued beyond the era 
of the Derg regime when cooperatives were used to 
extend strong government control to the local level 
and promote socialist ideology through compulsory 
participation.. The above results could therefore be 
driven by a slow process of trust recovery into these 
organizations. Having said this, it can also be argued 
that commercialization indicator captures the total 
amount of cereals sold by the farmers, and is not 
restricted to sells through the cooperative. Moreover, 
since the median age of the cooperatives in this sample 
is over 7 years old, it can be argued that members 
would have had sufficient time to update their 
perceptions and expectations of their cooperatives in 
light of the present Government’s strategies. A more 
likely explanation may lie in the heterogeneous impact 
of cooperatives across households, driven by different 
behavioral responses to these higher prices. 
Specifically, some households may choose to sell less 
and retain more for their own consumption since they 
are compensated by higher revenues from the higher 
price. The next section proposes a simple analytical 
model to illustrate this argument.  
Heterogeneous impact of cooperatives 
The results presented in Table 7 are averages and as 
such do not capture the heterogeneity of impact across 
households. There is however no reason to believe a 
priori that membership in a cooperative will imply 
homogenous responses for different categories of 
farmers. To see this, we plot in Figure 2 the density 
distributions of cooperatives’ impact on members’ 
percentage production sold (upper graph) and on 
output prices (lower graph).(We note that the two 
matching techniques employed are relatively close to 
each other in their assessment of the individual 
impact.) 
As expected, the figure displays a great amount of 
heterogeneity in members’ response to their 
participation into cooperatives. We note in particular 
that some cooperative members’ share of production 
sold (PS) is almost double the level of their non-
member counterparts. However, for a large number of 
other members, this level is significantly lower than 
their estimated counterparts, despite higher prices 
within the cooperative. 
< Figure 2 about here > 
The low price-elasticity of farmers supply in poor 
countries has been widely studied over the past two 
decades. In particular, it has been shown that 
transaction costs may lead to price bands whereby Cooperatives and Smallholder Farmers 
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households are better-off autarkic than participating in 
markets. In other cases, households may not be able to 
seize market opportunities due to low asset 
endowments, credit constraints or price-risk aversion. 
The latter may be particularly important for very poor 
households for whom food insecurity and price risk 
may lead to preference for food self-sufficiency (see 
De Janvry, Murgai and Sadoulet (1999) and De Janvry 
and Sadoulet (2003) for in depth reviews). As a result, 
exogenous price increases, unless sufficiently high, 
may not result into greater market participation among 
small farmers.  
In the present case however, it appears that some 
farmers tend to even decrease their marketed surplus 
as a result of the price increase given by the 
cooperative. Given the staple nature of the crops 
considered, this phenomenon may be explained by the 
comparison of the effect of the price increase on both 
the household’s production and consumption 
behaviour. While a price increase will probably lead to 
positive (or null) production response, its effect on 
consumption level is more ambiguous, such that the 
overall impact on market surplus is unclear. This may 
be particularly the case for poorer households with 
lower supply response capabilities and greater 
(positive) income elasticity of cereals consumption. 
A simple way to see this is to consider both the facts 
that: (i) the vast majority of rural households in 
Ethiopia are not fully autarkic as they need to fulfil 
minimum liquidity needs (for consumption, production 
or tax purposes); (ii) poorer farm households typically 
face food shortage. As a result, when facing a price 
increase allowing them to cover their liquidity needs 
with a lower quantity of output, poorer farmers will 
reduce the fraction of output marketed and increase 
that consumed. In contrast, for larger farmers who 
already are able to fully cover their consumption 
needs, an increase in price should lead to an increase 
marketed.  
Overall, facing higher output prices for staple crops 
such as cereals, the smallest farmers may substitute out 
of the market, whereas the larger one will tend to 
supply more. We test these predictions in Table 10 
below, where we investigate household-level 
correlates of cooperative impact on both output price 
and the share of output sold. The first two columns 
report OLS estimates of the impact of membership on 
output prices. Columns (3) and (4) report Tobit 
estimates of the impact of cooperatives on the 
household’s share of cereals production sold – 
households without any production sold in 2005 are 
considered censored observations.  
Importantly, the above hypothesis predicts that 
households with a relatively low level of production 
before joining the cooperative will tend to supply less 
on the market than their non-member counterparts. As 
such, using the actual production level to differentiate 
between smaller and larger may be misleading in that, 
production level may itself respond to price incentives. 
Instead we use the number of hectares of farm land 
“owned” by the household as a proxy for its actual 
level of production. Given the land ownership regime 
in Ethiopia discussed in Section 3, this variable is 
considered as exogenous, at least in the short or 
medium term. Other variables in the estimation 
include the household head’s reading ability, 
household size, and a set of Kebele-level control 
variables used in the definition of the development 
domains. 
< Table 8 about here > 
Columns (1) and (3) report simple average estimates 
of the cooperative’s impact. Coefficients in the upper 
part of the Table indicate as expected that households 
with higher education and living close to markets sell 
more of their production and at higher prices. Larger 
households however tend to sell less of their output. 
Interestingly, favorable agro-climatic conditions (i.e. 
surplus-producing areas) tend to have depressing 
effects on prices, while positive effects on households’ 
marketed surplus. Finally, land owned does not seem 
to exert any effects on the output price received by the 
household, although each additional hectare will lead 
to an increased marketed surplus. In the middle part of 
the Table, we report the coefficients on a membership 
dummy. As expected from the estimations in Section 
6, cooperative membership does have a significant 
positive impact on output price, although there is no 
significant effect on the share of production sold 
In columns (2) and (4), we further refine the analysis 
by interacting the membership dummy with household 
and Kebele-level variables. None of the coefficients 
obtained for the price regression differs significantly 
from zero, indicating that no obvious discrimination 
exist between members regarding the output price. In 
column (4) however, we find that the effect of 
membership on the percentage production sold 
increase with the size of the landholding. Furthermore, 
as indicated by the model’s negative constant, the Tanguy, B. et al.  
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impact of membership is negative for the smallest 
farmers while positive for the larger ones. 
Conclusion 
Over the past decade, Ethiopia has embarked on 
a major policy drive to promote smallholder marketing 
cooperatives as a way to increase the 
commercialization of smallholder agriculture and the 
improvement of smallholder livelihoods. Using data 
drawn from a survey of nearly 7,200 rural Ethiopian 
households, this paper attempts to shed light on the 
policy discourse over the role and impact of 
cooperatives.  
Previous studies have shown that the incidence of 
cooperatives in Ethiopia remains fairly limited; and 
that cooperatives tend to be located in places with 
better market access and lower exposure to 
environmental and price risks.  and are thus less likely 
to benefit their members relative to more difficult 
areas. We also found that, on average, cooperative 
members are better educated and operate more land.  
Specifically, this paper has examined the extent 
to which cooperatives affect their members’ 
commercialization behavior. The analysis is based on 
propensity score matching, the use of which is justified 
by the fact that most Ethiopian cooperatives were 
created under a government policy target of 
establishing the impulse of an external partner and not 
by members themselves.  
This, along with the fact that the government 
stated policy objective is to provide cooperative access 
in all kebeles of the country allows us to consider the 
actual cooperative development as an interim phase of 
a nationwide government-induced program and 
therefore use standard program evaluation techniques. 
In particular, we proceeded to a two-step 
matching procedure whereby kebeles with 
cooperatives are first matched with kebeles without 
cooperatives using a series of observable 
characteristics. In a second step, cooperative members 
were matched with households living in comparable 
kebeles and who would have likely participated to 
such organizations had they had access to it. This 
careful selection and matching process ensures a 
robust and relatively unbiased estimation of the true 
impacts of cooperatives on household 
commercialization behavior. 
We evaluate impact on three possible outcomes: 
the decision to sell on the market (marketing position), 
the extent of market participation (share of output sold 
on the market), and the prices obtained in the market. 
The results are somewhat sobering. At the aggregate 
level, cooperative membership has no impact on the 
share of members’ production that is sold, despite a 
7% higher price for the output sold in the organization. 
When the analysis is further refined, we find that 
smaller farmers tend to sell less on the market given 
the higher prices obtained by the cooperative, while it 
is the opposite for larger farmers. This can be 
explained by consumption effects that exceed the 
production effects for smaller farmers. 
These findings have significant policy 
implications. First, they show that cooperatives are 
effective at providing marketing services to their 
members: the positive and significant impact of 
membership on price reveals that cooperatives do 
serve their expected purpose on commercialization 
through better market opportunities, higher bargaining 
power or reduced transaction costs.  
Second, these results, when combined with lower 
cooperative membership rates among smaller farmers, 
suggest that cooperatives alone may not be sufficient 
to effectively promote smallholder commercialization. 
If it is true that commercialization enhances 
productivity and income in the long run, 
complementary institutions need to be designed to 
address the specific needs of the smallest farmers.  
Finally, beyond location and household profile, 
there are particular characteristics of cooperatives 
themselves that may constrain their capacity to affect 
their members’ commercialization. This latter issue, 
on the determinants of cooperative performance in 
supporting their members’ commercialization is the 
subject of a forthcoming companion paper. 
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Table1. Treatment and control kebeles, by development domains 
Domain  %   Control 
kebeles 
%   Treatment 
kebeles 
1  Highland, moisture reliable, high market access, high population density  8.97  13.64 
2  Highland, moisture reliable, high market access, medium population density  24.83  21.21 
3  Highland, moisture reliable, high market access, low population density  2.07  4.55 
4  Highland, moisture reliable, low market access, high population density  4.14  0.00 
5  Highland, moisture reliable, low market access, medium population density  20.00  10.61 
6  Highland, moisture reliable, low market access, low population density  2.76  0.00 
7  Lowland, moisture reliable, high market access, medium population density  3.45  1.52 
8  Lowland, moisture reliable, high market access, low population density  0.69  0.00 
9  Lowland, moisture reliable, low market access, medium population density  1.38  3.03 
10  Lowland, moisture reliable, low market access, low population density  4.83  0.00 
11  Highland, drought prone, high market access, high population density  1.38  1.52 
12  Highland, drought prone, high market access, medium population density  2.76  12.12 
13  Highland, drought prone, high market access, low population density  1.38  1.52 
14  Highland, drought prone, low market access, high population density  1.38  1.52 
15  Highland, drought prone, low market access, medium population density  3.45  13.64 
16  Highland, drought prone, low market access, low population density  2.07  3.03 
17  Lowland, drought prone, high market access, high population density  1.38  0.00 
18  Lowland, drought prone, high market access, medium population density  0.69  3.03 
19  Lowland, drought prone, high market access, low population density  2.67  1.52 
20  Lowland, drought prone, low market access, medium population density  2.07  3.03 
21  Lowland, drought prone, low market access, low population density  4.83  3.03 
22  Lowland, pastoralist, high market access, low population density  2.76  1.52 
   100 %     
(146 obs) 








Table 2. Treatment and control kebeles, distribution by region 
  Tigray Amhara Oromia  Beneshangul - 
Gumuz 
SNNP Harari  Total 
Control kebeles 1  25  37 1  22  1  87 
Treatment kebeles 14  8  19  0  6  0  47 Cooperatives and Smallholder Farmers 
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Table 3. Balancing tests: Treatment and control kebeles 













Population (number of households)  4584.66  5454.64  0.0693  4566.45 4713.06  0.7812 
% female-headed hh  14.65  21.43  0.0201  14.64 18.27  0.2666 
% households Orthodox  45.41  57.85  0.1500  44.60  42.61  0.8327 
% households Muslim  40.31  25.52  0.1313  39.85  33.14  0.5445 
% households speak Amharic  54.21  46.55  0.2910  56.02  59.85  0.6316 
Existence commercial bank   11.49  12.76  0.8301  11.90  18.18  0.3782 
Existence Micro-finance institution  25.28  46.80  0.0111  23.80 30.30  0.4734 
Importance of traditional institutions*  48.81  46.00  0.8629  46.69  50.96  0.4266 
Number of DAs  1.76  2.54  0.0004  1.77 2.06  0.1958 
Productive Safety Net Woreda**  26.43  38.29  0.1574  25.00  27.27  0.8021 
Existence of Primary school  87.35  91.48  0.4727  86.90  87.87  0.8884 
Direct access to Seasonal/dry road  52.87  68.08  0.0897  53.57 57.57  0.6984 
Access to Safe water  44.82  65.95  0.0193  45.23 54.54  0.3688 
Number  obs  87 47   84  33  
Note:  Bold p-values indicate differences significant at the 10% level or lower 
* % conflicts resolved through Shimagile (council of elders) as opposed to local courts. 
** The productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) targets to provide food or cash through public work and direct support , to 8.3 millions 
chronically food insecure individuals in 268 Woredas.  
Note:  Bold p-values indicate differences significant at the 10% level or lower 
* % conflicts resolved through Shimagile (council of elders) as opposed to local courts. 
** The productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) targets to provide food or cash through public work and direct 







Table 4. Distribution of households across treatment and control kebeles 
 Control  kebeles Treatment  kebeles Total 
Non cooperative members  1798  674  2472 
Cooperative member  0  142  142 
Total 1798  816  2614 Tanguy, B. et al.  
















Table 5. Probit estimation of determinants of cooperative participation 
 Coefficient  p-value    Coefficient  p-value 
Age of households head  0.012  0.006  Number  of  small  ruminant 
owned 
0.040 0.180 




Household head reads  -0.003  0.979  Number of poultry owned  0.013  0.685 
Households size  0.063  .0631  (Number of poultry owned)
2  -0.000 0.673 
(Household size)
2  -0.004 0.683  Produces  teff  0.297 0.043 
Radio ownership  0.087  0.550  Produces wheat  -0.065  0.693 
Household receives non-farm income  -0.103  0.438  Produces maize  -0.270  0.099 
Number of hectares held  0.600  0.000  Produces barley  -0.653  0.000 
(Number of hectares held)
2  -0.058 0.018  Produces  Sorghum  -0.176  0.227 
Number of oxen owned  0.049  0.734  Produces oats  -0.798  0.162 
(Number of oxen owned)
2  0.004 0.876  Produces  dagussa  -0.556  0.026 
Number of cattle owned  0.019  0.701  Development  domain  dummies 
(5-1)
yes  
(Number of cattle owned)
2  -0.002 0.403  Constant    -1.399  0.023 
Number of observation :    782      Non-member  Member  Total   
Pseudo-R
2:                          0.2668    Predicted 
non-
member 
614 93  707   
Correct prediction rate:      85%    Predicted 
member 
28 47  75   
   Total  642  140  782   Cooperatives and Smallholder Farmers 





Table 6. Balancing tests of matched samples 

















Age of household head  48.529  42.993  0.000  48.28  49.52  0.519  48.28  49.29  0.598 
Gender of household  head 
(1=Male, 2=Female) 
1.10 1.18  0.012  1.10 1.06  0.220  1.10  1.04  0.043 
Household Head reads 
(1=Yes 2=No)
0.37 0.31  0.104  0.38 0.34  0.542  0.38  0.36  0.705 
Household  size  6.05 5.14  0.000  5.93 5.82  0.689  5.93  5.81  0.675 
Radio (1=Yes, 2=No)  1.41  1.21  0.000  1.39  1.34  0.455  1.39  1.34  0.480 
Non-farm income (1=Yes, 
2=No)
1.50 1.54  0.421  1.50 1.54  0.461  1.50  1.54  0.526 
Land owned (hectares)  2.18  1.35  0.000  2.05  2.17  0.465  2.05  2.19  0.386 
Oxen  (number)  1.67 0.89  0.000  1.54 1.45  0.588  1.54  1.54  0.980 
Cattle  (number)  5.30 3.42  0.000  4.97 4.63  0.468  4.97  4.87  0.839 
Ruminan  (number)  3.32 2.47  0.012  2.81 3.70  0.109  2.81  3.89  0.052 
Poultry  (number)  3.69 2.06  0.000  3.69 3.11  0.253  3.69  3.13  0.263 
Cereal production (in kg)  1156.8  682.76  0.000  1086.8  1018.6  0.628  1086.8  1042.2  0.765 
Note: bold p-values indicate differences significant at a 10% level or lower. 
Table 7. Effect of cooperatives on members’ cereals commercialization 
 Kernel-based  matching  5  nearest neighbors matching 
  ATT  Std. error  ATT  Std. error 
% Price Difference (PD)  6.745  2.868**  7.608  4.321* 
% Production Sold (PS)  0.601  2.046  0.930  2.531 
N.B. Stratified bootstrap with 100 replications are used to estimate the standard errors 
** Significant at 5%, * significant at 10% Tanguy, B. et al.  
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Figure 2.  Distribution of cooperative membership impact across households 
Kernel density estimates: (Y axis measures the density of households, X axis measures the impact of 
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Table 8. Heterogeneous effects of membership on commercialization 
 
  Price Difference  % Production Sold 
 OLS  Tobit   
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Land owned (in ha)  0.134  -0.070  4.147  3.651 
 (0.833)  (0.874)  (0.679)***  (0.709)*** 
Hh  head  reads  4.322 4.387 3.758  3.929 
  (2.172)** (2.267)* (1.779)**  (1.851)** 
Household Size  0.058  0.201  -0.992  -0.936 
 (0.499)  (0.518)  (0.384)***  (0.395)** 
Market  access  7.223 6.631 4.199  4.245 
 (2.293)***  (2.336)***  (1.806)**  (1.830)** 
Population  density  -5.443 -4.093 -6.555  -6.089 
 (3.365)  (3.577)  (2.559)**  (2.724)** 
Agricultural potential  -25.164  -26.947  12.030  10.600 
  (4.239)*** (4.330)*** (3.098)***  (3.162)*** 
Treatment 12.296  -28.237  0.919  -20.242 
 (3.893)***  (27.696)  (3.183)  (20.675) 
Treatment  x  …       
Land owned (in ha)    2.383    5.574 
   (3.037)   (2.449)*** 
Hh  head  reads   3.709   0.253 
   (8.409)   (6.708) 
Household  Size   -2.481   -1.173 
   (2.031)   (1.578) 
Market  access   7.591   -8.385 
   (14.724)    (11.650) 
Population  density   -10.738   -0.401 
   (10.665)    (7.949) 
Agricultural  potential   44.080   25.166 
   (22.452)**   (15.389) 
Constant 12.333  17.527  -16.477  -14.867 
 (11.678)  (15.991)  (3.765)***  (3.842)*** 
# Observations  854  854  1800  1800 
      (927 obs censored at %=0) 
Notes: Reported are coefficients for both OLS and Tobit estimations.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * signif. at 10%; ** signif. at 5%; *** signif. at 1% 
 